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The Kurdish population has undergone many hardships since the end of World War I and the breakup of the Ottoman 
Empire. On multiple occasions, they have been 
promised and have even fought for a state of 
their own to no avail, making them the largest 
ethnic population in the world without their own 
state. Throughout their history, since the Treaty 
of Lausanne in 1923, they have been broken up 
into multiple organizations across four principle 
nations: Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey. In each 
nation, they have been oppressed and separated 
from the greater society to thwart their desire 
to create a single independent Kurdistan. 
However, while they are without loyalty to 
their national governments there is also little 
loyalty between one another. Infighting between 
the two major political parties of the Kurdish 
Autonomous Region of Northern Iraq is not 
unusual. The Syrian Kurdish Defense forces 
have reported several clashes with the Kurdistan 
Workers Party’s Syrian off-shoot while also 
fighting against ISIS. Disunity among the 
various organizations has hampered a coalesced 
independence effort and instead, left each group 
to search for independence or greater autonomy 
independently of the others. The Kurdish people 
do have a right to the referendum that was held 
in Northern Iraq on September 25th that would 
begin the process of creating an independent 
Kurdistan in northern Iraq. However, the 
political realities of the region combined with 
a lack of an effective governmental authority 
in the claimed area and a lack of international 
recognition and guaranteed protection of the new 
state from regional players, provide grounds for 
why it should not have passed. 
 The rights of minority ethnic groups have had 
various interpretations throughout history. For the most 
part of history, states and similar institutions came into 
existence as a result of waging war. Meaning that should 
a minority group wish to have its own state they create 
it by revolution. However, since the closings of World 
War I and II, decolonization, and the break up Yugoslavia 
and other dimensions have been added to this theory. The 
closing of the First World War had a profound effect on 
the creation of states. President Wilson’s Fourteen Points 
characterized the end of World War I, one of which dealt 
with the self-determination of peoples (Nawaz 1965). 
This pattern can be seen through the creation of ethnically 
homogeneous states like Austria, Lithuania, Hungary, and 
Poland. The League of Nations vaguely referenced to self-
determination in its founding charter in Article 22 (Nawaz 
1965). However, the League of Nations failed to fulfill 
the right due to the reluctance of the French, British, and 
various other European powers to give up their colonial 
possessions. It was not until the creation of the U.N. that 
the right to self-determination was actually given greater 
credence. 
 The United Nations was a much more powerful 
successor of the League of Nations. As M.K. Nawaz 
points out in his article for the Duke Law Journal, two 
articles of the U.N. charter, self-determination is directly 
expressed as a right of citizens of the world: 
The expression "self-determination" is explicitly 
mentioned in two articles of the Charter. Article 1 (2) 
specifies one of the purposes of the United Nations 
to be the development of "friendly relations among 
nations based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take 
other appropriate measures to strengthen universal 
peace." Article 55, relating to international economic 
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and social cooperation, states that the United Nations 
shall promote certain objectives "with a view to 
the creation of conditions of stability and well-
being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly 
relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples." (Nawaz 1965)
This explicit recognition of the right gave it greater 
legitimacy in international law, precipitating into the 
1960’s and rapid decolonization of the European holdings 
across the globe. By the 1960’s, Africa went into full scale 
revolt against its colonial overlords. France, Belgium, The 
United Kingdom, Portugal, and others all tried to hold 
onto their colonial possessions in Africa, but they quickly 
realized that it was not feasible to do so. Thus, began the 
decolonization of Africa under the guidance of the U.N. 
creating the borders we have today on the continent.
 In each instance, the groups allowed to express the 
right have been relegated to certain geographical areas 
and given to certain people. In the case of post-World War 
I the victors, France and Britain, drew borders for new 
countries that were once a part of the Austro-Hungarian and 
German empires in Europe but meanwhile gathered more 
colonial holdings and left their own colonial possessions 
untouched. In the post-World War II era, Africa and the 
Indian sub-continent were the only places decolonized. 
Britain, France, and the U.S. still held onto some of their 
colonial possessions in the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. 
Additionally, another important contradiction between 
the two periods is pointed out by Rupert Emerson during 
the Proceedings of the American Society of International 
Law:
The point of the contradiction lay in the fact that the 
people involved in the Wilsonian period were ethnic 
communities, nations or nationalities primarily 
defined language and culture, whereas, in the present 
era of decolonization, ethnic identity is essentially 
irrelevant, the decisive, indeed, ordinarily the sole, 
consideration being the existence of a political 
entity in the guise of a colonial territory. Thus two 
quite different and mutually incompatible definitions 
of “people” entitled to exercise the right of self-
determination marked by the two periods: in the 
first, politically shapeless ethnic communities were 
authorized to disrupt the existing states; in the second, 
the inhabitants, however haphazardly, assembled by 
the colonial power, take over pre-existing political 
units as independent states, but with firm prescription, 
reiterated in substance under various auspices as in 
Resolution 1540 (XV), that ‘any attempt aimed at 
the partial or total disruption of the national unity 
and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible 
with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations’ (Emerson 1971)
Now the previous situation regarding the right to self-
determination has a different connotation, in that it allows 
for people like the Kurds, who are under alien rule, the 
ability to secede from that rule. According to the precedent 
set by the decolonization of Africa, the Kurds should 
not be allowed the right, seeing as they do not meet the 
specific qualifications for how the U.N. operates. Because 
Iraq was a country that was already created, the U.N. is not 
looking to violate the territorial integrity of its members 
excessively. This means that the right of succession is not 
included in the U.N.’s definition of self-determination. 
These conflicting sentiments regarding self-determination 
and secession have led to confusion as to when peoples 
are allowed the right of self-determination and when 
secession is allowed. But, there is a corollary on this 
precedent set forth in the friendly relations declaration 
by the U.N. It stated that secession is allowed under the 
doctrines of the U.N., so long as certain principles are 
violated (Johnson 1973). The circumstance allowing 
secession must follow a certain pattern according to Hurst 
Hannum in the Encyclopedia Princetoniensis: 
The principle of territorial integrity or political unity 
would seem to be superior to that of self-determination, 
since ‘[n]othing in the foregoing paragraphs’ shall 
be construed to authorize or encourage ‘any action’ 
which would impair this principle. However, this 
restriction applies only to those states which conduct 
themselves ‘in compliance with the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples as 
described above and thus possessed of a government 
representing the whole people belonging to the 
territory without distinction as to race, creed or 
colour.’ (Hannum 2010)
If a state violates these circumstances it has agreed to as a 
member of the United Nations, then it becomes possible 
that the right to self-determination supersede the right of 
the state to maintain its territorial integrity as a result of 
the declaration (Johnson 1973). The Kurds in Iraq have 
suffered heavily under Iraqi Arab rule, particularly under 
Saddam Hussein. The Anfal Campaign that Saddam 
pushed resulted in the death 182,000 Kurds in northern 
Iraq (Romano 2010). This campaign made the Kurds 
second class citizens and essentially took citizenship 
away by forcibly removing people from their homes in 
several towns in northern Iraq as well as employed Sarin 
gas to kill thousands. Not only that, Saddam’s government 
also had no Kurdish representatives in it, making it an 
exclusively Arab ruled state (Romano 2010). These 
transgressions constitute an effective restriction of the 
basic human rights ensured to peoples across the globe 
as per international law and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. 
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 One defense Baghdad, Ankara, or Tehran may use 
to try to deny the self-determination of the Kurds is that 
it would endanger their right to self-determination. For 
example, creating a Kurdistan in south eastern Turkey 
would harm the Turks to self-determination because the 
Kurds would attempt to take over Turkish land or carry 
out terror attacks on Turkey. However, this argument is 
problematic when considering possible states as Jonathan 
Berg explains in his piece for the Public Affairs Quarterly 
“the right to self-defense cannot be exercised until the self 
is under attack. In terms of nations this means that the 
sovereignty of one must not be violated until that nation 
has commenced an attempt against the sovereignty of 
another.” (Berg 1991) When talking about a group like 
the Kurds, who have no sovereign state under the rule of 
their own government and no other governing authority, a 
state cannot claim self-defense since the violation of their 
sovereignty only might happen and is not rooted in reality. 
Once it has come to reality, the state is free to act as it 
must to maintain it national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, but it cannot act preemptively.
 Kurds in Syria, Iran, and turkey have experienced 
similar treatment to their Iraqi brethren. In Syria Kurds 
were denied citizenship by President Bashaar-al Assad who 
prohibited them from participating in the census (Sherry 
1996). Assad also pursued measures similar to Saddam by 
sending large Arab populations into the Kurdish inhabited 
regions of the nation to “Arabize” them (Sherry 1996). 
In Iran, the Kurdish populations are mistreated even still 
today, with proponents of independence being targeted 
by officials in government, unlawful killings by security 
forces, cultural repression, discrimination in housing, 
work, employment, and education (Amnesty International 
2008). 
 However, the Turks have a more interesting history 
with the Kurds. For a long time, relations between 
the Kurds and Turks had been shaky as the Marxist 
Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) vied for independence. 
This included a bloody insurgency that was ended with 
a ceasefire between the PKK and Turkish government. 
But as the insurgency ended, relations between the Turks 
and Kurds began to improve. Kurdish was allowed to be 
spoken in the classroom, Kurdish parties were allowed 
representation in government, and the police state in the 
south-east began to subside (Göksel 2015). However, a 
combination of Erdogan’s changing agenda as he became 
more autocratic, the beginning of the Syrian Civil War, 
the rapid and terrifying growth of the Islamic State, and 
the steady growth of representation of Kurdish interests in 
government quickly soured relations. Now, the insurgency 
has resumed and the PKK is launching more guerilla 
campaigns against Turkish Armed Forces while Turkish 
tanks roll into villages that contain PKK fighters (Göksel 
2015). As well the Turks have at times been able to work 
with the KRG in knocking out terror groups and granting 
protection from Baghdad (Alaaldin 2016). Needless 
to say, the laundry list of mistreatment is by no means 
exclusive to one single group of Kurds. 
 Clearly this distinct ethnic group is not safe under the 
authority of their current governments. The expression 
of the right to self-determination by the Iraqi Kurds is 
legitimate and in accordance with international law. 
The referendum is a nonviolent way for the region to 
secede in a semi diplomatic fashion and is justified under 
international law. The state of Kurdistan would be much 
safer than the current situation for all parties currently 
living with Kurds within their borders. As seen in Turkey, 
Kurdish Nationalism has become a potent ideology that 
has led to a bitter fight between the PKK and the Turkish 
government with nearly 30,000 people having perished 
in the fighting (Göksel 2015). In Iran, the PJAK fought 
a long guerilla war, as well, against the Iranian military, 
killing 120 Iranian soldiers in 2005 alone plus more in 
consecutive years according to the Iranian government 
(Global Security 2014). These states are experiencing 
violence as a result of the oppression levied against the 
Kurds which has led to more oppression and then led to 
more violence. No longer having the Kurds within their 
borders would go a long way in helping to stem the tide of 
violence within the four principal nations of Iran, Turkey, 
Iraq, and Syria. Additionally, the new homogenous state 
of Kurdistan would understandably be much safer for the 
Kurds as homogenous tribal groups, like the Kurds, rarely 
devolve into genocidal and heavily oppressive actions 
against one another. Unfortunately, while this right ought 
to be ensured to this mistreated ethnic group, the political 
realities of the situation do not allow for the safe exercise 
of the right to self-determination.
 Before we address the realities of the situation a quick 
history lesson is in order. Kurdistan once briefly existed in 
the early days of 1946 when the Soviets occupied parts of 
Iran during World War II. This was called the Republic of 
Mahabad, founded by the Kurdish population in Iran as a 
self-ruling democratic entity. However, it was dismantled 
by the Shah when the Soviets withdrew from the area a 
few months later (Council on Foreign Relations 2017). 
The short-lived republic spawned a more important group 
known as the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which 
is the founding and ruling party of the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) based out of Erbil. The KRG has 
been in control of Northern Iraq since July 1992 after the 
First Iraq War. The KDP has had a historic rivalry with 
Kurdistan Union Party (PUK), a Marxist offshoot of the 
KDP, which erupted into a civil war for control of the 
KRG in 1994 and lasted until 1998 (Gunter 1996). Once 
the war finished the KDP unified the KRG behind the Iraqi 
Kurdistan Front and the PUK fell in line with guaranteed 
representation in the government, as per the Washington 
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Peace Accord that ended the civil war. Since then, the two 
parties have cooperated with one another for the good 
of their people. In 2005 when the Iraqi constitution was 
drafted under United States supervision, the U.S. made 
sure that the Kurds had a healthy amount of representation 
of their interests while writing the constitution (Romano 
2010). This led to provisions recognizing the creation of an 
autonomous region in the north of Iraq to be administered 
by the KRG. This came at a cost. The crude oil pumped 
out of the KRG controlled oil fields could be sold so 
long as a portion of the revenue went to the Iraqi Federal 
Government in Baghdad and to the KRG (Romano 2010). 
 Kurdistan continually asks the Federal Government in 
Baghdad ‘when will the KRG become fully autonomous?’ 
Economically the KRG is still heavily tied to Baghdad 
because of the revenue sharing program. There are two 
sets of revenue pools that are shared between the two 
governments. One being the overall taxes collected by 
the federal government and the other being oil sales. 
The first works by the Iraqi National Congress setting 
aside 15% of the national budget for the KRG to use as 
it pleases (Natali 2015). The way the oil revenue sharing 
program works is that the KRG produces a certain volume 
of oil prescribed by Baghdad to the State Oil Marketing 
Organization (SOMO), who then gives the KRG their 
share of the oil sales at the end of the period, according to 
how much they gave into the total pool of oil sold from 
Iraqi oil wells. Should the KRG not give the full amount 
prescribed then the revenues, and usually their portion of 
the government budget as well, are withheld until it gives 
the missing volume to SOMO (Knights 2014). Along with 
this, the KRG gets most of its money to operate from the 
overall revenue of Iraq. The KRG only receives what the 
Iraqi federal government wishes it to receive. As such 
Baghdad has cut the KRG allotted budget by over 95% 
in the past couple of years (Natali 2015). This has caused 
serious problems for the region’s economic development 
according to Denise Natali in her article for Al-Monitor 
entitled “is Iraqi Kurdistan Heading towards a Civil 
War?”: 
The availability of electricity has decreased to 2005 
levels, or about four hours a day in many areas 
without private generators. Tens of thousands of 
youths continue to migrate from the region. The once-
touted Kurdish energy sector is being undermined 
legally and politically. Although the KRG exports 
about 600,000 barrels of oil per day to Ceyhan, 
these exports remain contentious, are dependent on 
Turkey and are largely sourced from Kirkuk — still 
a disputed territory — and not the Kurdistan Region. 
International oil companies have thus far abandoned 
19 oil fields in the Kurdistan Region, including 
ExxonMobil’s withdrawal from three of its six fields. 
(Natali 2017)
The lack of foreign capital has resulted in an underdeveloped 
energy sector, little modern infrastructure, and a lag on 
payment of government salaries by over two years (Natali 
2017). This is due in part, to the fact that Iraq has not 
had time to rebuild since the rise and retreat of ISIS, the 
need to fight a war, and because the KRG has repeatedly 
sold oil outside of SOMO. Due to this violation of Iraqi 
federal law, Baghdad has responded by withholding both 
sources of revenue from the KRG, leaving the region 
with very little capital to further develop (Zhdannikov 
2015). Having infrastructure in the current state will only 
create more problems in a newly independent state that 
needs rapid development of an independent export based 
economy.  Considering the rebuilding of infrastructure is 
unlikely to happen anytime soon, given that ISIS is not 
completely expunged from Iraq. It is better to stay under 
Baghdad’s rule to help spread the cost that would burden 
them in rebuilding with the rest of the country and quicken 
the pace at which rebuilding can occur. 
 Kirkuk is one of the larger cities in northern Iraq 
and boasts 9 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves 
(CFR 2017). This city is claimed by both the KRG and 
Baghdad, and it would have to be negotiated as to who gets 
ownership of the city when it comes time to drawing the 
borders of an independent Kurdistan. Baghdad has stated 
that it will not accept any outcome in which Kirkuk is not 
under its authority. Meanwhile, the KRG claims Kirkuk 
as sovereign Kurdish territory. While the current territory 
the KRG has allotted to it by Baghdad has 4 billion 
barrels of proven reserves the difference of 4 to 13 billion 
barrels of crude oil reserves is critical to a new microstate 
surrounded by hostile neighbors (CFR 2017). Currently, it 
is assumed that there is a Kurdish majority in the city of 
Kirkuk. However, there has not been an effective census 
in the city since 2003 so there is no guarantee that it is 
still the case (NCCI 2010). The current city council of 41 
has ethnic composition twenty-six Kurds, nine Turkmen, 
and six Arabs so it is possible that the city is made up of 
a Kurdish majority if these numbers are representative of 
the greater population (Aljazeera 2017). This would give 
reason for the city to be included in the new borders to be 
drawn. But, since the city has 4% of the total global oil 
reserves within its control, it is highly likely that Baghdad 
will disregard this fact to keep the city in its control (CFR 
2017).  Already the Kurds have tried to act independent 
of Baghdad regarding their economy to disastrous 
consequences as explained by Denise Natali in previous 
article for the Brookings Institute:  
The KRG’s financial break from Baghdad has had 
direct consequences on the Kurdistan Region’s 
internal stability and economic viability. In the 
absence of a financial buffer to replace Baghdad 
(by June 2014 the KRG had no savings in its central 
bank) the KRG’s oil gamble with Turkey has 
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devastated and destabilized local populations and the 
economy. Civil servant salaries have gone unpaid for 
months, thousands of local businesses have closed, 
IOC payments remain in arrears, new investment has 
halted, and nearly 25,000 Kurds, mainly educated 
youth, have fled the Kurdistan Region over the past 
eight months. The KRG has also borrowed billions 
from Ankara and local businesses while front-loading 
its oil sales to 2016 in the attempt to meet operating 
costs and a U.S.$22 billion debt accumulated over the 
past year. (Natali 2015)
The KRG has made deals independent of Baghdad and 
SOMO to sell its oil reserves with Turkey as an attempt to 
gain further independence from Iraq. But, in the process 
they attracted the ire of Baghdad resulting disastrously for 
the Kurdish economy. Without Kirkuk, the KRG would 
have some oil but not nearly enough to be an effective 
state and generate enough income for the government to 
function properly. Additionally, it is essential to consider 
is the new cost added on by defense. Under the current 
system the Kurdish defense forces known as Peshmerga 
are paid for by two sources, the KRG and Baghdad 
(Ahmed 2017). If the KRG secedes, it is left to defend all 
of its territory and maintain its armed forces of 115,000 
fighters all on its own (CFR 2017). While the Islamic 
State is losing ground very quickly it is still far from being 
defeated, as it already has started to become an al-Qaeda-
like organization and begun to switch over to operating 
in cells to carry out attacks (Engel 2017). While the KRG 
operates largely independent of Baghdad’s authority 
economically it is still far from independent of Baghdad’s 
economic influence. Additionally, the KDP and PUK 
both have a heated rivalry that, with the emergence of the 
Islamic State, has subsided temporarily. With ISIS falling 
on all fronts, the reemergence of this rivalry is inevitable 
given their current social and economic standing. 
Problems such as exceedingly high foreign debt, large 
numbers of refugees to be taken care of, and the inability 
to pay government salaries and provide services are what 
led to the 1998 civil war in northern Iraq between the 
KDP and PUK that devastated the area (Natali 2017). 
Ultimately the state would be paralyzed with inefficiency 
should it become independent from within, which would 
leave it open to attack from the outside.
 The next aspect to observe is the general lack of 
acceptance from the world regarding the referendum. 
Both Iran and Turkey have stated that there will be harsh 
repercussions should the vote happen. The two nations fear 
that the referendum will embolden Kurdish insurgencies 
within their borders to renew their push for independence. 
Turkey plans on applying sanctions to the KRG to 
eliminate the ability to sell oil through the one pipeline 
that goes through the KRG across the Turkish border to 
the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, Turkey (Bektas 2017). 
Iraqi and Iranian foreign ministries both stated they would 
work together to draft responses to the upcoming vote. 
More than likely that they will come up with economic 
sanctions of their own (El-Ghobasy and Fahim 2017). 
Normally when regions declare independence there is 
an international power who supports and protects the 
nation. When Kosovo declared independence in the 
1990’s, the U.S., Western Europe, and NATO were able to 
shield Kosovo politically and militarily from the Serbian 
Government allowing Kosovo to remain independent. 
However, no regional power or any international power 
has voiced any support for the referendum besides Israel, 
who is not capable of ensuring the independence of the 
would-be nation. France has voiced lukewarm support 
by stating that they would not oppose or support the 
referendum. However, the real shock to the international 
community, and to the Kurds in particular, was when the 
U.S. stated the referendum needed to be postponed (NPR 
2017).
 The reason that the KRG exists as a semi-autonomous 
region is because of the U.S. In the aftermath of the first 
Gulf War in 1992 the U.S. established a Kurdish safe 
haven in northern Iraq (al-Khafaji 1996). Saddam Hussein 
continued to push further north with his anti-Kurdish 
agenda and pursued a number of genocidal actions. These 
measures included the Anfal Campaign, which was the 
forced relocation of Kurds out of Kirkuk and several 
other cities and pushed further north to increase the Arab 
population in the area, thereby making the area more 
responsive to his rule (al-Khafaji 1996). But, according 
to David Romano, Saddam Hussein was not satisfied and 
continued by “using internationally prohibited chemical 
weapons in such areas as the city of Halabja, Balisan and 
parts of the Duhok Province. They have razed some 4,500 
towns and villages while driving tens of thousands of 
unarmed civilian Kurds, among them Faylis and Barzanis, 
into an unknown future” (Romano 2010).
 Then in 2003 the U.S. invaded Iraq once more and 
this time ousted Saddam Hussein. In the post war theatre, 
the U.S. stayed and provided stability to Iraq and helped 
ensure the creation of a new democratic constitution 
recognizing the KRG. The U.S., along with rebuilding 
the nation, also acted as a mediator between the Arab 
majority country and the Kurds helping to ease tensions 
(Romano 2010). However, the U.S. withdrew and the rise 
of ISIS dramatically changed the U.S. foreign policy in the 
region. No longer was the U.S. focused on stabilizing the 
region in the wake of large power vacuum, now the focus 
was on holding Iraq together and defeating the Islamic 
State. This change in foreign policy is the reason why the 
U.S. will not acknowledge the referendum. The U.S. spent 
billions of dollars, thousands of lives, and political capital 
stabilizing Iraq and is not ready to let Iraq be divided 
without its approval. At first the goal was preventing the 
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Islamic State from taking over Iraq, and then it evolved 
into the overall destruction of the Islamic State once 
their advance was halted and reversed. The U.S. then 
began providing airstrikes against the Islamic State while 
supplying arms and other supplies to the Kurds in both 
Iraq and Syria to help fight ISIS (Glenn 2016). The U.S. 
still had the desire to preserve stability in the region, but 
stability now had a new context. Rather than managing 
ethnic conflicts and defusing tensions which had been the 
case in the post 2003 world, it was now about preventing 
the onslaught of anarchic jihad, being perpetrated by ISIS, 
against states weakened by recent wars. The U.S. seeks 
territorial integrity of current nations, until the Islamic 
state has no more ground under its control. After the 
defeat of ISIS, the U.S. will allow talk of the creation of 
new states but no sooner. Since, the Kurdish referendum 
is a step towards secession, current U.S. foreign policy 
does not support the timing of the referendum (Dubin and 
Tamkin 2017). 
 Since neither the U.S., Turkey, Iran, Iraq, nor any 
other major regional or international power is willing to 
support or recognize the referendum, it carries no weight. 
International law regarding self-determination exists, 
and a plethora of treaties and international organizations 
recognize the right but almost exclusively for colonial 
holdings (Emerson 1971). It has been used for groups not 
in colonial holdings, i.e. Kosovo, but the vast majority 
of cases have been colonial domains in the decades after 
World War Two (Emerson 1971). However, in practice 
there is no set legal way for peoples to exercise their right 
to self-determination without the aid of an outside power. 
Currently, no designated international organizations exist 
to enforce the right, which means these struggles for self-
determination by minority populations in countries are 
left to the mercy of the government. Aleksander Pavkovic 
and Peter Radan point in their Essay for the Macquarie 
Law Journal that “Territorial sovereignty still remains the 
central source of political power and the main locus of 
international recognition,” which is to say that control of 
the land allotted to a nation is how a government maintains 
its legitimacy (Pavković and Radan 2003). Given the 
newness of the Iraqi government and the humiliation it has 
suffered at the hands of the Islamic State, Iraq is keener 
than most to strengthen its legitimacy and not tolerate 
any secessionist movement. Since there are currently 
no outside powers willing to protect the KRG from the 
repercussions of the referendum or even try to mediate 
between the Iraqi Arabs and Kurds, the referendum must 
fail. Pavkovic and Radan further explain that “in relation 
to the question of whether the liberty of a minority within 
a state prevails over the liberty of the majority, cases of 
attempts to secede from a liberal- democratic state suggest 
that it is the majority that prevails,” (Pavković and Radan 
2003). 
 Timing of the Kurdish referendum has dictated 
the response to it. The cease fire that had been in place 
between the Turkish Government and the PKK is now 
mute, and fighting has resumed (Butler 2015). The 
Turkish Parliament also renewed a bill authorizing the 
military to conduct operations in Iraq and Syria if there are 
national security threats present (Bilginsoy 2017). Both 
nations have Kurdish minority populations who could 
aid the PKK in its insurgency providing easy justification 
for military action against the KRG by the Turkish 
government. The Turkish military also has long history of 
conducting raids in Northern Iraq on PKK encampments 
there (BBC 2017). Meanwhile Iran has begun to block 
flights to their Kurdistan region amid safety concerns as 
well as scheduled wargames along their border with the 
KRG (Reuters 2017). Iran also moved tanks to the border 
with Iraqi Kurdistan in the days after the referendum 
(Jalabi 2017). 
 The governments of Iran and Turkey both have 
encountered serious internal divisions within their 
populace aside from their unruly Kurdish populations. 
Last summer, Erdogan, Prime Minister of Turkey, 
experienced an attempted military coup d’etat and is 
still under a state of emergency to this day from that 
event. The state of emergency is still in effect is because 
Erdogan is still unsure of the military’s loyalty. This is 
seen through the dismantling of the military court martial 
system and replaced with the civilian court system, a place 
where Erdogan has more support than within the military 
(Gurcan 2017). Another change is that the National 
Intelligence Organization, the Turkish equivalent of the 
NSA, is now given the authority to investigate any soldier 
or company at any time for supposed disloyalty (Gurcan 
2017). What this represents is that Erdogan’s position is 
still not secure and requires more time in order to make 
it secure, and an emboldened PKK is something he fears 
would only prolong his cementation of power. In Iran, the 
Ayatollah’s power has been heavily tested by the recent 
president Hasan Rouhani, leading to split in the political 
power of the state. No longer is it under the iron rule of 
the Ayatollah, instead the upstart liberal reformer Rouhani 
is expanding presidential authority at the expense of 
the Ayatollah (Stratfor 2017). These political divisions 
within these two countries dictated their response to the 
referendum. Because the power within their country is 
being uprooted, and, given everything going on in the 
Middle East at this time, having to deal with one more 
bellicose population striving for independence is another 
challenge the ruling authorities would rather remain 
undisturbed. Given the push back from these nations and 
the world as a whole Kurdish independence should be 
further postponed. 
 The Kurds have experienced many hardships 
throughout their history and continue to do so today. 
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Having their own state is a major way to prevent future 
discrimination and should be given to them in accordance 
with international law. However, to create a state that 
is likely to have volatile domestic politics, an unstable 
economy, and no regional or international allies combined 
with the current state of affairs of the Middle East would 
be a disaster for the Kurds. The region itself is already in 
a state of chaos; adding one more conflict to the plethora 
that already exist would not be beneficial to the other 
states of the Middle East. Forcing the Kurds to wait for 
independence when they will be more able to defend 
themselves and run a successful state is going to be part 
of many nations’ foreign policy for the foreseeable future. 
Waiting is something the Kurds clearly do not enjoy, as 
92% of the 3 million Kurds who voted for independence 
on September 25th proved (Qiblawi 2017). But it is 
necessary given the current political and economic 
predicament of the Kurds and their neighbors.
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